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ABSTRACT
This paper presents our assessment of field experience related to
pressurized water reactor (PWR) primary system leaks in terms of their
number and rates, how aging affects frequency of leak events, the safety
significance of such leaks, industry efforts to reduce leaks, and
effectiveness of current leak detection systems.  We have reviewed the
licensee event reports to identify the events that took place during 1985
to the third quarter of 1996, and reviewed related technical literature and
visited PWR plants to analyze these events.  Our assessment shows that
USNRC licensees have taken effective actions to reduce the number of
leak events.  One main reason for this decreasing trend was the
elimination of reportable leakages from valve stem packing after 1991.
 Our review of leak events related to vibratory fatigue reveals a
statistically significant decreasing trend with age (years of operation), but
not in calendar time. Our assessment of worldwide data on leakage
caused by thermal fatigue cracking is that the fatigue of aging piping is
a safety significant issue. Our review of leak events has identified several
susceptible sites in piping  having high safety significance; but the
inspection of some of these sites is not required by the ASME Code. 
These sites may be included in the risk-informed inspection programs.
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents our assessment of the U.S. experience relating to
pressurized water reactor (PWR) primary system leaks in terms of their
number and rates, how aging affects frequency of leakage events, the
safety significance of such leakages, industry efforts to reduce the leak-
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age events, and effectiveness of current leak detection methods.  Five
specific actions were taken to perform the assessment:  (a) review of
licensee event reports (LERs) related to leak events, (b) development of
a database to identify trends, distributions, and causes of leak events, (c)
visits to PWR plants,  (d) review of related technical literature  including
USNRC communications and reports prepared and/or submitted by
licensees,  and (e) analysis of selected leak events.
The scope of our study was to review the LERs relating to PWR
primary system leaks submitted during the  period 1985 through the third
quarter of 1996, representing about 638 operating years for U.S. PWRs.
Several leak events that took place outside the study period or, in the case
of thermal fatigue, outside the United States were reviewed to
complement this study.  The review included only those leak events that
occurred during hot shutdown, hot standby, startup, and power operation.
 Leak events that took place during cold shutdown and refueling were not
included, nor were the events associated with intersystem leaks or steam
generator tube leaks.
We present our specific findings in four areas: (1) trends of annual
rates of U.S. PWR primary coolant leaks, (2) trends in world-wide leak
events caused by thermal fatigue, (3) safety significance of piping thermal
fatigue, and (4) information relevant to risk-informed inspection.  Other
findings related to risk significance of the leak events and effectiveness
of leak detection systems may be found in the NUREG report by Shah et
al. (1998).
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TRENDS OF ANNUAL RATES OF PWR PRIMARY COOLANT
LEAKS
We  searched  the USNRC Sequence Coding and Search System
(SCSS) database to identify the LERs that are  potentially associated with
the reactor coolant leak events. We reviewed the LERs located by this
search and identified 215 LERs associated with leak events that occurred
during the study period. Some of the 215 LERs were associated with
more than one leak event, that is, a leak occurred at more than one
location in the RCS.  As a result, we found 240 leak events associated
with the 215 LERs included in the study.  Of the 240 events, 199 leak
events (associated with 174 LERs) were reported because of leaks. The
leak rate in most of these events exceeded a plant technical specification
limit, and were reportable leaks in accordance with Title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Section 50.73 (10 CFR 50.73),
“Licensee Event Report System.”  In some of the 199 events, the leak rate
was smaller than the technical specification limit, but the event was
reported because there was a potential for the leak to exceed the limit. 
Several leak events associated with reactor coolant pump seal
degradation fall into the later category.   Hereafter, these 199 leak events
are referred to as reportable leak events. 
The remaining 41 events were instances where a reactor coolant leak
was mentioned in the LER narrative, but the LER was not prepared
because of leak.  These 41 events represent nonreportable leak events and
are not included in the trends presented here.
Primary System Leak Event Frequencies and Leak Rates
The trend of the 199 reportable leak events is shown in Figure 1. 
More than half of the leak events (121 events) occurred during the first
4 years of the study period.  The frequency of leak events is also shown
in Figure 1, and is calculated by dividing the number of reportable leak
events for a given calendar year by the number of PWR operating years
Figure 1.  Distribution of reportable leak events and their frequencies
during the 1985–1996 period.  The frequency for 1996 is estimated based
on the operating years for 1995, accounting for data only through the
third quarter of 1996.
for the same year.  The frequency of reportable leak events has
significantly decreased since 1986.  One reason for the decreasing trend
of leak events is the elimination of valve stem packing degradation as a
major mechanism causing reportable leak events.
Investigation of the data presented in Figure 1 shows a statistically
significant decreasing trend in the frequencies of the reportable leak
events as presented in Figure 2.  The solid line shows the estimated trend
and the dotted lines show 90% confidence bands.  For this investigation,
the trend, if present, is assumed to have an exponential form.  The data
are barely consistent with this modeling assumption because two of the
thirteen 90% confidence intervals do not overlap the fitted line.  A formal
goodness-of-fit test did not quite reject the assumed exponential form.
Excluding the first 4 years from the analysis, the reportable leak events
that occurred since 1988 do not show any statistically valid trend.
Distribution of the reactor coolant leak rates for 153 events, which
occurred inside the containment, is as follows.  The maximum leak rate
was less than 3.8 L/min (1 gpm) for about 29% of the events, whereas it
was greater than 76 L/min (20 gpm) for about 7.2% of the events.  The
maximum leak rates were not reported for about 25% of the events.  The
highest leak rate was 760 L/min (200 gpm), which resulted from a
transient-induced LOCA event that occurred at Fort Calhoun on March
7, 1992.  A pressure transient caused a pressurizer safety valve to lift. 
Figure 2.  Statistical analysis of a trend in the frequency of reportable
leak events showing point estimates, 90% confidence bands, and 90%
confidence intervals.
Safety injection was demanded and subsequently the plant had to 
depressurize and cool down. The second highest leak rate was 494 L/min
(130 gpm), which was caused by a failed compression fitting on the RCS
hot leg instrument line at Oconee 3 on November 23, 1991.  This was an
isolable leak, but could not be isolated until the plant was placed in cold
shutdown and airborne activity levels decreased sufficiently to allow
containment entry.
Out of 199 reportable leaks, there were 67 unisolable leaks; 45 of
which were pressure boundary leaks.  Seven leaks were isolable leaks but
the environment resulting from the leaks made it difficult to isolate them.
An isolable leak is defined as a leak that can be stopped by closing a
valve or placing a valve on its backseat.  A leak that was isolable with
difficulties could have been isolated because of plant design; however,
because of a personnel hazard associated with such a leak, it could not be
stopped until the plant changed operating modes.  The frequency of
pressure boundary leaks showed no statistically significant trend during
the study period.
The distribution of the maximum reactor coolant leak rates for the 67
unisolable leak events is as follows: leak rate less than 3.8 L/min for 34
events; between 3.8 L/min and 5 L/min for 12 events; between 5 and 10
gpm for 3 events; and 25, 40, and 200 L/min for one event each.  The
leak rate was not known for the remaining 15 events.
Dominant Causes of the Primary System Leaks
Degradation mechanisms were identified for 124 leak events.  The
three major degradation mechanisms causing primary system leaks are
vibratory fatigue (29 events), packing degradation (29 events), and stress
corrosion cracking (SCC) (16 events) (Shah et al. 1998).  Other
mechanisms include, for example, seal and gasket degradation.   Leak
events associated with packing degradation show a significant decreasing
trend with none reported since 1991.  Leak events associated with the
other two major mechanisms do not show any trend in calendar time. 
However, the leak events associated with vibratory fatigue do show a
decreasing trend in age (time in service); this fact is presented later in this
section.
The distribution of the 16 leak events associated with SCC by the type
of mechanism is as follows:  ten events were caused by primary water
stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC), 3 by transgranular stress corrosion
cracking (TGSCC), 2 by intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC),
and the SCC mechanism is not known for one event.  For the 10 leak
events caused by PWSCC, leakage occurred through the Alloy 600 base
metal in eight events and through the weld metal used with Alloy 600
components in one event; the location for the 10th event was not
reported.  The maximum leak rate associated with these events is ≤1.5
L/min (0.4 gpm).
The two components with the most leaks were the valves and pipes, 97
for valves and 42 for piping and instrument lines.  The highest leak rate
from a valve was 760 L/min (200 gpm) at Fort Calhoun as discussed. 
The next two highest leak rates, 179 and 171 L/min (47 and 45 gpm),
were caused by packing degradation and occurred in 1987 and 1991,
respectively.  The highest leak rate in the piping, 331 L/min (87 gpm),
was caused by vibratory fatigue and occurred in 1986. 
The distribution of the 42 leak events in piping and instrumentation
lines by degradation mechanism is presented in Table 1.  Out of 42 leaks,
40 were through welds in stainless steel piping and instrument lines, and
2 were through the Alloy 600 base metal and were caused by PWSCC.
Table 1.  Distribution of reportable leak events in piping and
instrument lines by degradation mechanisms.
Pipe Size, mmDegradation
Mechanism
≤25
mm
between 25
and 102 mm
between 102
and 305 mm
Vibratory Fatigue 15 13
Thermal Fatigue 1 1
Mech. Fatigue 1
PWSCC 2
IGSCC 1 1
TGSCC 1
SCC 1
Unknown 4 1
Trends in Leak Events Caused by Vibratory Fatigue Cracking
Trends of the vibratory fatigue-related leak events in calendar time and
plant age were statistically investigated as shown in Figures 3 and 4,
respectively.   The effect of calendar time reflects the evolving body of
regulations, design improvements, and industry-wide learning.  The effect
of plant age reflects the learning of plant personnel and the aging of the
hardware.  Solid curves in Figures 3 and 4 show the estimated trend in
calendar time and with age, respectively.  The dotted lines show 90%
confidence bands.  A trend in this investigation, if present, is assumed to
have an exponential form.  The data are consistent with this modeling
assumption, because all point estimates of 90% confidence intervals
overlap the fitted trend line.  The results in Figure 3 reveal no statistically
significant trend in calendar time, whereas the results in Figure 4 reveal
a statistically significant decreasing trend with age.  Apparently, the
decreasing trend implies that the vibratory fatigue failures are caused by
premature aging because of inadequacy of the initial design and
fabrication.  In other words, the decreasing trend implies that the
vibratory fatigue failures are not caused by aging damage resulting from
long-term operation.
TRENDS IN WORLD-WIDE LEAK EVENTS CAUSED BY
THERMAL FATIGUE
Thermal fatigue cracking leading to PWR primary system leaks is not
widespread in nuclear power plants; only four leaks have been reported
 in U.S. plants, two of which took place during the study period. 
Therefore, we have complemented these data with world-wide data for
such leak events.  The world-wide data are associated with all Western-
designed PWRs and two Loviisa units from Finland.
Figure 3.  Statistical analysis of a trend in the reportable vibratory
fatigue-related leak event frequencies estimated by calendar year.  Point
estimates, 90% confidence bands, and 90% confidence intervals are
shown.
Figure 4.  Statistical analysis of a trend in the reportable vibratory
fatigue-related leak event frequencies estimated by plant age (years in
service).  Point estimates, 90% confidence bands, and 90% confidence
intervals are shown.
Thirteen leak events caused by thermal fatigue cracking of PWR
reactor coolant piping have been reported (Jungclaus et al. 1998).  In
addition to these events, thermal fatigue cracks have been detected at two
EDF plants during 1997: Dampierre 3 and Fessenheim 2 (INES 1997).
 Most of these  thermal fatigue failures occurred because of the turbulent
penetration, thermal cycling, turbulent mixing, and thermal stratification
and striping phenomena that were not taken into account in the original
design (Shah et al. 1998)
The 13 leak events are listed in Table 2 along with the data related to
piping system through which leakage occurred, throughwall crack
location and size, and leak rate for each event.  These events took place
in the U.S., France, Belgium, Finland, Germany and Japan.  One event
took place during the plant initial startup test, 2 took place during the
first 10 years of operation, and 10 took place  during the 10-to-25 year
period of operation.  For most of these events, throughwall cracking was
in an unisolable portion of the small-diameter (≤~200 mm) reactor
coolant piping.  In eight of these events, the throughwall cracking was in
the weld or its heat-affected zone.  In the other four events the
throughwall cracking was away from the weld and in the base metal of an
elbow, straight pipes, and a valve body.  In the remaining one event, the
throughwall cracking was both in the weld and adjacent base metal.  The
leak rate was ≤ 3.8 L/min. (1 gpm) in 9 events, and ≥3.8 L/min. in the
remaining four events.  The maximum leak rate was 500 L/min. during
the May 1998 leak event at Civaux 1 plant. 
Trends of the thermal fatigue-related leak events (listed in Table 2) in
terms of plant age were statistically investigated, as shown in Figure 5.
 We used the world list of nuclear power plants (as of December 1997)
published in the March 1998 issue of Nuclear News.  All Western-
designed PWRs were counted from this list; two Loviisa units from
Finland were also included.  Both operating reactors and the reactors that
have been shutdown were counted, 217 reactors in all.  For the reactors
that have been shutdown, the years when the reactors were in operation
were included in the analysis.  The plant ages were collapsed into 5-year
groups,  as shown in Table 3, and the number of leak events was counted
for each group.  The ages of the plants were calculated as of May 31,
1998.  The zero count for age group 25-30 is not surprising because very
few plants are that old.  The extrapolated value of estimated leak
frequency (leak events per reactor year) for this age group is 1.5E-2.  For
this frequency, it is more likely to see zero leak events in 43.9 reactor
years than to see one or more events in that time period.
Figure 5.  Statistical analysis of a trend in the thermal fatigue-related
leak event frequencies estimated by plant age (years in service).  Point
estimates, 90% confidence intervals, and 90% confidence bands are
shown.
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Table 3.  Distribution of thermal fatigue-related PWR RCS leak events
by plant age.
Age
(years in
service)
Reactor
Years
Number
of Leak
Events
Leak Events/Reactor
Year (frequency)
0.0-5.0 1052.1 2 1.9E-3
5.0-10.0 982.5 1 1.0E-3
10.0-15.0 756.9 4 5.3E-3
15.0-20.0 442.4 4 9.0E-3
20.0-25.0 230.9 2 8.7E-3
25.0-30.0 43.9 0 0
The dots and vertical bars show point estimates and 90% confidence
intervals for the leak frequency, each based only on the data for one 5-
year age group.  A trend in this investigation, if present, is assumed to
have an exponential form.   The solid curve in the figure shows the
estimated trend with age.  The dotted lines show a 90% confidence band.
 The data are consistent with the exponential modeling assumptions
because all the confidence intervals overlap the fitted trend.  The results
in the figure reveal that the leak events associated with thermal fatigue
follow a statistically significant increasing trend with age.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF PIPING THERMAL FATIGUE
Our assessment of world-wide data for the leak events caused by
thermal fatigue indicates that the fatigue of aging PWR branch lines may
become an issue as plants get older.  Our reasons for the assessment are
mainly based on the phenomena causing thermal fatigue, crack
morphology and its growth, and limitations of inservice inspection of
branch lines.
Thermohydraulic phenomena that caused the thermal fatigue cracking
at Farley 2, Tihange 1, and other PWRs are not yet well understood. 
Qualitative understanding of these phenomena has been developed under
a program sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to
investigate thermal stratification, cycling, and striping (TASCS) (EPRI
1993).  However, it appears that the quantitative aspects of turbulent
penetration and thermal cycling phenomena have not been fully
developed under the TASCS program and significance of these
phenomena in the failures at Farley 2 and Tihange 1 has not been clearly
established.  The TASCS experimental program and analytical
methodology do not predict the locations of these failures correctly.  The
TASCS methodology predicts higher cyclic stresses at the end of the
turbulent penetration column where thermal cycling may take place if
valve inleakage is present, and lower stresses at locations within the
turbulent penetration column where temperature differences approach
zero.  But when the TASCS methodology is applied to the Farley 2 safety
injection line fatigue failure, the throughwall crack location is within the
calculated length of the turbulent penetration column and not at the end
of the column where the cyclic stresses are expected to be higher and a
fatigue failure is more likely to occur.  Because the Tihange 1 failure is
similar to the Farley 2 failure, the TASCS methodology is not likely to
predict correctly the throughwall crack location in the Tihange 1 safety
injection line.  This discrepancy between the calculated and actual
location of cracking implies that the thermodynamic phenomena that
caused these failures are not well understood (USNRC 1996, 1997a;
Lund and Hartzman 1998). 
Past experience with thermal fatigue cracking indicates that the crack
growth is slow, and it leads to leakage but does not challenge the
structural integrity of the pipe.  Experience with a rapidly growing fatigue
crack, however, is limited.  Such a rapid crack growth occurred at
Dampierre 1 in 1997.  A portion of the safety injection line was replaced
during the repair for the 1996 leakage event (see Table 2).   A crack
initiated and propagated to 67% throughwall depth in the replaced piping
within 8 months after the replacement.  This result contradicted the
fatigue analysis results for the replaced piping, which indicated that the
crack should not initiate for years, even when taking into account local
thermal loads revealed by temperature monitoring of the piping (Merle
1998).
The French safety authority recently identified  a concern related to
analytical evaluation of safety margins  for thermal fatigue cracking.  The
stability of big cracks in a small diameter piping under seismic conditions
combined with a cold leakage through a valve is not well assessed by
analysis.  The earthquake  can make the cold leak more severe, resulting
in larger thermal loads on piping. Physical tests evaluating the stability
of such cracks are not yet performed.  An experimental validation of the
margin term may be needed (Merle 1998).
Field experience shows that a large leak rate through a thermal fatigue
crack could lead to a small break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) 
For example, a leakage rate of 500 L/min (132 gpm) through a fatigue
crack in residual heat removal (RHR) line was reported at Civaux 1 at the
end of its initial startup test phase (INES 1998, MacLachlan 1998).  Such
throughwall cracking might occur without being detected during
inservice inspection because of low crack initiation time, high crack
growth rate, and a large crack size.  The recent experience at Dampierre
1 indicates that a small, nondetectable fatigue crack in a safety injection
line could become a throughwall crack in one fuel cycle, indicating a
high crack growth rate.
The recent cracking at Oconee 2 suggests the possibility of uniform
crack growth that may lead to a long throughwall crack.  The growth of
the circumferential crack was uniform (~ 30% through wall) over about
78% of the circumference as shown in Figure 6 (USNRC 1997b).  The
faster growth in the remaining portion of the crack was probably due to
cold fluid flowing up from the warming line, causing thermal mixing in
 the upper portion of the pipe cross section near the damaged weld.1 In
the absence of the warming line flow, the crack growth would have been
more uniform, which could eventually lead to a longer throughwall crack
accompanied by a larger leak rate.
1
V. N. Shah, private communication with J. M. Davis, Duke Power,
November 17, 1998.
Figure 6.  Angular distribution of depth of the circumferential crack at
the safe-end-to-MU/HPI line weld.
Applying the leak-before-break concept to PWR piping with a
diameter smaller than 152 mm (6 in.) is difficult.  The concept has been
approved for the main coolant piping at most U.S. PWRs and for several
other piping, including residual heat removal and safety injection piping
with a diameter equal to or greater than 152 mm, but not for any smaller-
diameter (< 152 mm) piping (Wichman et al. 1997).
Current inservice inspection techniques and requirements for branch
lines, that is, small diameter piping, have several limitations.  ASME
Section XI requirements for Class 1 piping with smaller than a 102-mm
(4-in.) diameter are  not adequate to detect thermal fatigue damage.  The
requirements include only surface examination of the welds (ASME
1989), but volumetric examinations are needed to detect thermal fatigue
cracks, which initiate on the inside surface.
It is difficult to detect thermal fatigue cracks at weld and base metal
sites during inservice inspection when the plant is shut down.  It is more
difficult to size these cracks.  These difficulties are more relevant for
small diameter piping.  For example, 33 to 66% of throughwall cracks
were not detected during inservice inspection in France (Merle 1998).
 Qualified inservice inspection techniques are needed to characterize
thermal fatigue cracks in the PWR branch lines.
At present, inspection of susceptible base metal sites (away from
welds) is generally not required at U.S. PWRs.  But five of the 13
leakages listed in Table 2, which were caused by thermal fatigue cracking
and took place world wide, have occurred through base metal.  Recently,
because of the 1996 leak event at Dampierre 1, the inservice inspection
program for the French PWRs has been revised to include the inspection
of base metal of the unisolable portion of the safety injection lines
(Gauthier 1998).  Shah and Ware (1994) also recommended inspection
of base metal sites susceptible to thermal fatigue cracking.  Risk-
informed inspections may address this inspection need at U.S. PWRs.
Current inservice inspection (ISI) methods may not be effective in
detecting a thermal fatigue crack before it becomes through wall if the
crack growth rate is high.  Recent experience at Dampierre 1 indicates
that a small, nondetectable fatigue crack in a safety injection line could
become a through- wall crack in one fuel cycle.
INFORMATION RELEVANT TO A RISK-INFORMED
INSPECTION PROGRAM
Our review and analysis of leak events has identified several sites in
piping that have high safety significance and are susceptible to cracking.
 These sites may be included in a  risk-informed inspection program. 
Data relevant to risk-informed inspection program are as follows:
• Leakage has occurred from piping with 254-mm (10-in.) or smaller
diameter.  No leakage has been reported from larger diameter piping.
• Degradation mechanisms that have caused throughwall cracking in
piping include vibratory fatigue, thermal and mechanical fatigue, and
three stress corrosion cracking mechanisms [PWSCC, TGSCC, and
IGSCC].
• Affected piping materials are mainly the 300-series stainless steels. 
One exception is Alloy 600 material, which is used for penetrations.
• Vibratory fatigue cracking of socket welds has been the predominant
cause for leakages from piping.  The associated piping has a diameter
smaller than 102 mm (4 in.).
• Leakage has generally occurred through piping welds, with two
exceptions.  In the case of PWSCC, leakage has generally occurred
through base metal.  In the case of thermal fatigue, 5 of 13 leakages
have occurred through base metal.
• Throughwall cracking has generally initiated on the inside surface,
with some exceptions.  The  main exception is vibratory fatigue, which
has initiated at the root or toe of socket welds.  Mechanical fatigue and
TGSCC can also initiate cracking at the outside surface.  For example,
mechanical fatigue initiated cracking at the outside surface of the weld
during the 1982 leak event at Crystal River 2, and TGSCC initiated
cracking at the outside surface of a drain line during the 1998 leak
event at Oconee 1 (Duke Power 1998).  Cracking at the outside surface
has been initiated at welds, not in the base metal away from the welds.
• It is essential that qualified inspection techniques that can reliably
detect the suspected damage be used.  As mentioned earlier, French
field experience  indicates that the current inspection methods did not
detect 33 to 66% of throughwall cracks during inservice inspection.
• It may be difficult to identify all susceptible locations for risk-informed
inspection.  One option may be to inspect all unisolable welds in
branch lines and other small-diameter piping.  One U.S. utility is
evaluating this option (Duke Power 1998).
• ISI may not be able to detect a crack before it becomes through wall
if the crack growth rate is fast.  A small defect, nondetectable during
regular ISI, could become a throughwall crack within an operating
cycle.  Generally, vibratory fatigue causes such a rapid crack growth
in socket welds. But, as mentioned earlier, thermal fatigue has also
caused such a rapid crack growth at Dampierre 1 in 1997.  Therefore,
other monitoring and inspection programs may be needed to identify
the susceptible locations in a timely manner: (1)  monitoring of valve
leakage and inspection for a loose thermal sleeve can assist in
identifying sites susceptible to thermal fatigue cracking, and (2)
vibration monitoring can identify socket welds susceptible to vibratory
fatigue cracking.
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
The paper has presented some of the findings of our assessment of field
experience related to PWR primary system leaks.  Five significant
findings are summarized as follows.
1. Reportable leak events show a statistically significant decreasing trend
in calendar time.
2. Thermohydraulic phenomena that caused thermal fatigue cracking in
PWR branch lines are not yet well understood.
3. Leaks through thermal fatigue cracks in branch lines could lead to an
SBLOCA.
4. Thermal fatigue has caused throughwall cracking in the base metal at
several PWRs.
5. Fast growing thermal fatigue cracks may require monitoring of valve
leakage and pipe wall temperatures.  Such monitoring can also be used
to identify other susceptible locations.
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party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus,
product or process disclosed in this paper, or represents that its use by
such third party would not infringe privately owned rights. 
